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ERIC LOO & MARTIN HIRST 
RECALCITRANT OR KERAS KEPALAr 
A CROSS·CULTURAL STUDY OF HOW MALAYSIAN AND 
AUSTRALIAN PRESS COVERED THE KEATING·MAHATHIR SPAT 
Please don't ask me any more questions 
about Dr Mahathir. I couldn't care less, 
frankly, whether he comes or no!. APEC is 
bigger than ;,11 of us - Auslr.:llia, the US, 
Malaysia and Dr Mnhathir and OIher 
recalcilrnms. 
Paul Keating, 20 November 1993, Seanle 
If you want (0 criticise me, criticise. we 
criticise many countries, we criticise the 
United States, we criticise China, we 
criticise RusSIa ... we should be allowed to 
speak freely in the international context 
also. And people should not lake offence 
at thaI. Not a personal insult. You [Keating] 
don't agree with some policies, you say so. 
Dr Mahathir, 9 December 1993, 
Puiuu Langkawi 
By media accounts it was a slow cold 
morning when Paul Keating responded to 
Australian journalists' questions on the 
Seattle airpofllarmac on 20 November 1993 
about the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad's absence from the 
APEC summit meeting \Sydney Morning 
Herald (SMH), 22 November 1993, 11. But 
within 36 hours, one word - recalcitrant -
created a media storm of political protest 
and threats of economic retribution from 
Malaysia. 
To Keating and the Australian media 
'recalcitrant' simply means an obstinate 
person. To Dr Mahathir and Utusan 
Malaysia, an influential Malay mainstream 
broadsheet, it means keras kepala (hard~ 
headed) which to Muslim Malaysians is a 
culturally derogatory term. Respect for 
elders and, particularly, a national leader, 
lies at the hean· of the Malay adat or value 
system' which is fundamental to the 
MalaySian national ideology, Rukunegara. 2 
Keating's remark was decoded by the 
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Malaysian media and politicians to have 
offended the 68-year-old Dr Mahathir, the 
country, and the Malay adal of politeness 
and respect for elders. While in Australia the 
media discourse focused on the issue of 
economic ties and bilateral relations, in 
Malaysia the 'recalcitrant' tag was a 
fundamental insult to dignity and respect. 
The New StraUs Times' (NIT) only editorial 
on the row, compared to five editorials in the 
Syduey Morning Herald (SMH) criticised 
Keating's remark as a 'loose cannon (which) 
was more powder than shot'. It said: 
As in nearly all the ruffles in the otherwise 
smooth relations between Malaysia and 
Australia, the hyperactivity of the Press has 
distorted the actual prOpOrtiOns of a minor 
incident ... before Australia can justifiably 
look forward to joining hands in the ASian 
community, one significant fealUre of its 
western society must give way 10 Eastern 
sensibility. Its free press must stop 
shooting from the hip, for the pleasure of 
the loud explosion. It could end up being 
shot in the foot. (NST, November 1993, 12) 
On one end of the spectrum, the 
Australian media is said to be: 
too willing to fit anything it can into 
certain stereotyped views of Malaysia [and 
Asial rather than making the much more 
intellectually demanding effort of trying to 
render just what a complex and diverse 
society Malaysia is.) 
Australian news coverage of Malaysia is 
often criticised for focusing primarily on 
inter-racial strife and human rights issue 
while ignoring the more developmental 
aspects of Malaysian politics and its 
relatively stable multiracial relations since 
the race riots on 13 May 1969. Rowlings 
(1989) asks if journalists and filmmakers are 
guilty of racism when they excessively 
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criticise Asians, or Asian 'culture' 'in the 
name of freedom of the press'. He likens 
their actions to 'yobbos' who scribble racist 
graffiti on walls. 
On the other end, the Malaysian media 
have given liberal space to a social and 
political discourse which paints Australia as 
a country which has not tOlally shed off the 
residues of a White Australia PoliCy, 'a 
country where Britain exiled all her convicts 
and felons',; where Aborigines are Hving in 
squalor under white rule, where labour 
practices have stifled Australia's economic 
growth, and where 'leisure is taken too 
seriously' (NST editorial, 27 November 
1993). 
Againsl this background, this article 
presents a content analytic account of the 
media's handling of the 'recalcirrant' row 
and argues that both the cultural and 
polilical subjectivity of journalists in both 
countries inevitably manifest themselves in 
the way the news is framed and constructed. 
BACKGROUNO TO MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS 
OF MAlAYSIA·AUSTRAlIA DIPLOMATIC TIFFS 
Prior diplomatic tiffs partly help to explain 
Dr Mahathir's strong reaction to Keating's 
'personal insult' in November 1993. 
MalaySia's periodic standoffs with Australia 
go as far back as 1975, when the then Prime 
Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, while on an 
official visit to Canberra, was greeted by 
student demonstrators protesting the 
detemion of Malaysian political activists 
under the Internal Security Act, a legacy of 
British colonial rule. The demonstrators 
hurled stones and cans of paint at Tun 
Razak's motorcade. Dr Mahathir alluded to 
that incidem when he was reported as 
saying 'we can guarantee that no one will 
throw paint at him [KeatingI' (Business 
Times, 26 November 1993) to a reporter's 
question on Keating's planned visit to 
Malaysia in 1994. (Keating visited Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam in early April 1994, 
but skipped Malaysia.) 
Other diplomatic tiffs arose from the ABC 
television series, Embassy (1990), and the 
film, Turtle Beach (1992), both of which 
were alleged to have grossly misrepresented 
Malaysian social and cultural systems. 
Protests against Malaysian logging activities 
by Australian environmental groups in from 
of the Malaysian embassy in Canberra from 
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1992-93 likeWise anl!oyed Dr Mahathir, his 
cabinet and sections of the Malaysian 
commercial elite. Diplomatic initiatives to 
Malaysia prompted by economic 
imperatives often came from the Australian 
side: in 1992-93 Australia's trade surplus 
with Malaysia was valued at US$657 million. 
Over the past two years, Malaysia had 
taken up relatively greater news space in the 
Australian media than in 1986 when two 
Australians, Kevin Barlow and Brian 
Chambers, were hanged in Penang for drug 
trafficking. At the time, Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke labelled Malaysian laws as 'barbaric'. 
Hawke later apologised for his remark. Just 
when the diplomatic cold from was thawing 
following these incidents, the Adelaide 
Commonwealth Games committee brought 
Malaysia back into the media limelight in 
mid-1992 when, after losing the bid, it 
questioned Kuala Lumpur's capability to 
host the 1998 Commonwealth Games. And 
in November 1992 there was the media run 
on the child custody dispute between Raja 
Kamarul Bahrin Shah, a nephew of the 
Sultan of Terengganu, and Jacqueline 
Gillespie, an Australian freelance television 
journalist from Melbourne. 
Australian media focus on MalaySia was 
sustained by the Malaysian film and 
Censorship Board's deCision to ban the 
award-winning movie, Schindler's List on 23 
March 1994 for its allegedly pro-Jewish 
sentiment. Following strong criticisms of the 
ban by both the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Anwar lbrahim/ and the Malaysian media,6 
the decision was soon reversed. This, 
however, was only reponed in the 
Australian papers as a filler, despite their 
initial interest in the proposed ban. By the 
general tenor of Australian media coverage, 
Malaysia continues to be perceived by 
Australians as generally a nation which is 
ideologically ultra Islamic and pOlitically 
anti-western. 
Three recent incidents further stereotype 
Dr Mahathir into an ami-western mould. 
first was Malaysia's downgrading of 
commercial relations with Australia and its 
adoption of a buy-Australia-last campaign in 
retaliation to Keating's remark from 24 
November to 12 December 1993. Second 
was Malaysia's boycott of British goods and 
companies' on 25 February 1994, following 
British media claims of corruption in Anglo-
Malaysian trade in Dr Mahathir's 






administration. Third, is Dr Mahathir'$ plan 
for an East Asian Economic Caucus, a 
regional trade group of Asian nations only 
excluding Australia and New Zealand. 
(Australian, 7 April 1995). 
THE AUSTRALIAN AND MAlAYS~N 
MED~ SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON 
The systems under which Australian and 
Malaysian journalists operate appear to be as 
diametrically opposed as Keating and Dr 
Mahathir are in their cross-cultural 
interpretation of a 'recalcitram'. In Malaysia, 
journalism is guided by the principle that the 
press should be a facilitator of national 
development and thus should exercise a 
degree of self-censorship for the collective 
good. In Australia, however, journalism is 
entrenched in libertarian principles of 
unfettered reponing. Australian journalisTs 
have at least some (expensive) access 10 
Freedom of Information laws in 
investigating aberrant behaviour both in 
government and commerce, while 
Malaysian investigative journalists are 
professionally constrained by the Of/fclal 
Secrets Act, Imernal Security Act, and the 
Prfnlfng Presses and Publications Act. 
The Malaysian press system is bener 
understood through a speech by Dr 
Mahathir in 1985 10 an ASEAN journalists 
conference in Kuala lumpur. Commenting 
on press freedom and social responsibility 
he said: 
Just as it is right in saying that a 
government has no monopoly on 
constructiveness and wisdom, the media 
must recognise that it too has no 
monopoly on constructiveness and 
wisdom. Just :lS the public servant must be 
prepared to accept criticism, so too must 
the media be prepared to accept criticism. 
Just as government is not above the law, 
the media too is not above the law. It 
Simply will not do if a public is subject to 
the laws on slate secrets but in the name 
of freedom others are not. Just as the 
media is not to be made subservient to the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary, 
in the same way and to the same extent 
the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary are not to be made subservient to 
the media. Just as the government cannot 
be allowed to have the freedom to do 
exactly as it pleases in society, so tOO the 
media cannot be allowed to do exactly as 
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it pleases in society. (Far Eastern 
Ecorw/Uic Review, 10 October 1985) 
Western journalists see the Malaysian 
press, with its collectivistic interpretation of 
government poliCies, as docile and 
subservient as opposed to the critical and 
adversarial role taken by the Australian 
papers in their interpretation and analysis of 
public poliCies and government 
accountability, However, from the 
developmental perspective of an emerging 
industrialised nation with its multiracial mix, 
Dr Mahathir's rationale is clear and simple. 
In March 1994, 100 Malaysian journalists, 
including the chief edilOrs of all the major 
newspapers, in reacting to British media 
criticisms, came out to declare formally that 
Malaysian newspapers 'make no apology for 
being supponive of the government elected 
by the people - a position we have adopted 
at our own free will', The declaration said 
the Malaysian media had fully supponed Dr 
Manathir's decision to refuse government 
contracts to Brilish companies 'so long as 
this campaign of slander and falsehood 
against our leaders continues'.8 
Malaysian papers have traditionally 
supported Dr Mahathir for varied reasons. 
He is SL"en as a leader who stands up to the 
West, a strength he has aptly demonstrated 
in his international speeches, among them a 
notable appearance at the world 
environment conference in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. In this sense, Dr Mahathir is viewed by 
the Malaysian media as a mouthpiece of the 
less developed nations. less obvious, but 
equally effective, is a cunailment of overt 
media criticisms of government policies and 
Dr Mahathir in particular. Malaysian press 
freedom is effectively restrained by punitive 
threats of detention without trial under the 
Internal Security Act, sedition laws, or 
closure under the Printing Presses and 
Publications Act.9 
Australian papers, on the other hand, 
while critical of Keating and his 
government's domestic and foreign policies, 
do share a collective interpretation of Dr 
Mahathir's hypersensitivity to western 
criticisms and political idiosyncrasies, Dr 
Mahathir is cast explicitly as a die-hard Asian 
chauvinist, an anti-western politician, but 
implicitly an effective politician. This 
caricature provides the Australian media 
with a common frame of reference, bO( one 
that is not always consistent. 
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Lindsay Murdoch, in his comment piece in 
SMH (4 December 1993, 23), describes Dr 
Mahathir as someone who 'bristles' at 
criticism and who has 'silenced the crilical 
press, cowed the judiciary and harassed the 
Opposition', but on the other hand, under 
Dr Mahathir's leadership, 'Malaysia has 
become one of the most dynamic economies 
of Southeast Asia'. Dr Mahathir is portrayed 
as a staunch nationalist who 'relishes the 
opponunity to confront a western country 
such as Australia and wants to leach the 
younger generation that they must remain 
fiercely conscious of their Asian identity', 
Using the metaphor 'an eye for an eye', 
Murdoch summarised the Keating-Mahathir 
row as unlikely to have any long-term 
damage to the ability of Australian firms to 
compete in Malaysia; 'But there will be a 
lingering perception that Dr Mahathir 
humiliated Mr Keating, as Mr Keating had 
humiliated Dr Mahathir - an eye for an eye' 
(SMH, 4 December 1993, 23). 
A Malaysian columnist, PC Shivadas, 
reacting to Australian media coverage said 
that Dr Mahathir's reaction to Keating's 
'recalcitrant' remark had largely provided 
Australian journalists the framework to label 
Mahathir as a 'blunt confrontationalist with a 
chip on his shoulder'. Shivadas defended Dr 
Mahathir, as most Malaysian journalists are 
obliged to, by saying that: 
instead of blaming the obvious, ie the 
unfairness of the Australian diatribes 
against Malaysia, they [journalists) go for 
what they deem to be inherent defects of 
his [Dr Mahathir's) character, in particular 
his unwillingness to behave like other 
Asian victims of the Australian media. Isn't 
the writer himself vying for popularity with 
his readers by playing on their anger at a 
man who refuses to conform to their 
perception of an Asian leader? (NST, 26 
November 1993) 
The generally supportive tone given to Dr 
Mahathir by the Malaysian press, however, is 
not as dearly reflected in the Australian 
coverage of Keating. In this context, two 
general research questions are explored: is 
the tone of the MalaySian newspaper 
coverage of the 'recalcitranl' row more 
nationalistic than mediatory compared to 
the Australian papers? Is the tone of the 
Australian newspapers more critical of 
Keating than of Dr Mahathir? 
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FRAMING THE NEWS ABOUT ASIA: 
A THEORETICAL OUTliNE 
The publication of the Garnaut repon in 
1991, which initiated the idea of an 'Asian 
ascendancy' and spurred Keating's 
aspiration to integrate into Asia, has to an 
extent steered Australian media and 
academic interests from their traditional 
focus on Britain and Ihe United States 
towards Asia, whose cultures, political and 
economic systems are seen as extremely 
divergent from Australia's. Past comparative 
studies of the Australian and Asian media 
systems limited themselves to regional 
broadcasting and films (Morgan 1991; Chua, 
1993), the most recent being a study of 
Australian Television International's 
positioning in Asia (Cunningham & Ritchie 
1994). 
Attempts to theorise the position of 
Australian media news frames of Asia in 
terms of an Australian cultural and 
ideological background are relatively new. 
Among the latest comparative studies is one 
on agendas that drive criticism of Australian 
reporting of Indonesia (Kingsbury 1993), 
Asian news values (Petersen 1992), and the 
Raja Bahrin-Gillespie custody dispute (Loo 
& Sankaran 1993). More comparative studies 
on the Australian and Asian media systems 
have been done on communication 
technology and broadcasting than on 
newspapers per se. Cunningham & Ritchie 
(1994) have done some important initial 
work on the ABC's Asia TV satellite service. 
Insights from these studies are outlined and 
applied in an analysis of the Keating-
Mahathir row as reponed in the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Australian. 
The theoretical framework of our article is 
a simple one based on the experience and 
familiarity of the authors with the media 
systems of Malaysia and Australia, We use 
the concept of news framing to explain how 
journalists from both countries interpreted 
the Keating-Mahathir row (Van Dijk 1988). A 
news frame generally refers to the 
organising principle journalists use to make 
a story coherent, for example, an inverted 
pyramid structure, headlines, lead, 
background and quotes. In the framing of a 
news report it may well be slanted, for 
instance when a relatively unimportant 
piece of infonnation is expressed in the 
headlines or lead, or when important 
Media International Australia 
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information is placed at the end or omitted 
altogether (Van Dijk 1988,15). In defining a 
news frame we refer to Van Dijk's 'abstract 
schema, consisting of conventional 
categories that specify what the overall 
function is of the topics of the text' (Van Dijk 
1991, 114). These conventions, or frames, 
are 'the slructures and contents of the 
specific mental model of this individual 
reporter abom this specific event: which 
provides a foundation for a 'general social-
cognitive schemata (prejudices)', which is 
'finally monitored by underlying group-
based ideologies' (Van Dijk 1991, 118). 
Rawlings (1989) suggests that these frames 
often blind journalists to potentially 
offensive blunders in their reporting. 
METHOD 
A contenl analytic study was chosen 
because it enabled us to systematically and 
objectively examine the mass-mediated 
messages of the Malaysian and Australian 
press. The Malaysian English newspapers 
analysed were the highest circulated 
national broadsheet, NST, and the national 
tabloid, the Slar. The Malay-language 
newspaper analysed was the national 
broadsheet, Ufusan Malaysia. The 
Australian newspapers analysed were the 
SMH and the national broadsheet, the 
Australian. 
The period under study was from 24 
November to 17 December 1993 for the 
Malaysian newspapers; and 23 November to 
19 December 1993 for the Australian papers. 
A total of31 articles were analysed in NST, 19 
in the Star, 16 in Ulusan Malaysia, 61 in 
SMH, and 83 in the Australian over the 
three-week period. 
This study separately examined all the 
news items, comment articles, letters and 
editorials published, and isolated major 
thematic elements that framed coverage of 
the incident, and which, in accordance with 
Tuchman's and Van Dijk's theoretical 
guidelines, defined the tone of coverage as 
critical or supportive of Mahathir/Keating, 
neutral, or mediatory, based on the choice of 
news angles and line of discourse. 
The unit of analysis was each newspaper 
article individually coded according to 
headlines, news angles, news leads, and 
attribution to named, or unnamed sources. 
The Malaysian articles were coded by the 
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first author, and Australian articles were 
coded by the second author. A sample of 
articles was cross-coded by the authors to 
ascertain the consistency in the definition of 
variables and coding. A few articles were 
recoded after continual discussions of our 
intuitive responses. 
As political and cultural subjectivity are 
our main objects of inquiry, we started out 
by coding the overall tone of coverage of the 
articles which were broken down into news, 
comments, editorials, and letters (Table 1). 
This was followed by a coding of the tone of 
coverage by the number of direct quotations 
(Table 2), the type of sources used in the 
stories (Table 3), coverage by frequency of 
thematic categories (Table 4), and frequency 
of thematic categories by the type of articles 
(Table 5), Tone of coverage was divided into 
supportive, critical, mediatory and neutral. 
Definitions of these categories are provided 
in the tables. 
Two techniques were used for the 
analysis: systematic classification and 
qualitative analysis. For the systematic 
classification variables coded were: 
• thematic categories: Keating's diplomatic 
conduct; Dr Mahathir's reaction, culrural 
differences; commercial ties; reconciliation; 
.sources of quotation: Malaysian/ 
Australian politiCians, Malaysian! 
Australian business, non-governmental 
organisations, Malaysian/Australian 
media, Malaysian/Australian ordinary 
citizens; 
• tone of quotation: critical or supportive 
of KeatingiMahathir; mediatory, neutral; 
• overall tone of story: critical or supportive 
of KeatinglMahathir; mediatory, neutral. 
For the qualitative analysis, all slOries 
were carefully read to examine some traits 
that might not be easily detected by 
categorisation. Images of the main actors as 
projected by the stories were analysed 
qualitatively, Our first impression of the 
articles, which we presumed to be closer 10 
the reality of how readers interpret issues 
when they read the newspapers, provide the 
main data. 
Only direct quotations were coded as we 
believe that they are more dramatic and 
decisive in depicting a situation compared to 
background information and the journalist's 
paraphrases. A direct quotation in a single 
paragraph is counted as one quote. If a long 
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quotation is broken up into two paragraphs 
they are counted separately, and so on. The 
direct quotations were coded in the 
following thematic categories: criticall 
supportive of Mahathir; critical/supportive 
of Keating; mediatory and neutral. 
The primary determinant of the theme is 
the headlines and lead. Because stories 
often had more than one prominent theme, 
each important theme in the story was 
coded. This explains why in Table 4 the 
thematic categories exceed the total number 
of articles analysed. 
The source categories are politicians; each 
nation's business community; non-
governmental organisations; notable 
individuals, such as diplomats; ordinary 
citizens; and the media. Each source is 
coded only when they are quoted directly in 
the stories. 
LIMITATIONS 
This study is mainly limited by logistiCS. All 
articles published in NST, the Star and 
Ufusan Malaysia were collected from the 
Malaysian High Commission in Canberra. 
Unlike the NSf, articles from the Star and 
Ulusan Malaysia may not be exhaustive. 
Photocopies of the news articles provided 
by the Malaysian High Commission also 
denied analysis of the prominence of each 
story in terms of its placement, visuals, and 
headline spreads. The Malay articles were 
translated by the first author. The second 
author extensively searched through the 
newspapers of the period and did on-line 
checks of databases. This allowed him to 
catch most items published, though the 
selection may not be definitive. 
Nevertheless, we noted an overall 
consistency in the tonal, thematic and 
source categories of the coverage which 
should provide a reliable framework of 
analysis. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The SMH was initially cautious in its view of 
the Keating-Mahathir row. It attempted to 
find common ground between the two 
leaders. Once the dispute appeared setded 
and at fairly low cost to Australia, the SMH 
took a more critical attitude towards 
Keating. Greg Sheridan set the tone for most 
of the Australian's coverage on the very 
morning the story broke: Paul Keating's off-
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the-cuff remark in Seattle was described as 
'idiotically gratuitous', 'counterproductive' 
and 'dumb' (Ausrralian, 23 November 1993, 
11). Sheridan later lamented Paul Keating's 
'legendary arrogance' in a comment piece 
headlined: 'We'll Pay the Price of PM's Pride' 
(Australian, 7 December 1993). Both papers 
oscillated between a desire to defend the 
national interest and therefore insisted on a 
Keating backdown, and defence of his use 
of strong language. 
The Malaysian papers collectively 
provided a channel for Dr Mahathir's UMNO 
Youth party in the early stages of the row. Ii 
was a coverage which was identical in its 
collective condemnation of Keating's 
remark primarily because Malaysian 
journalists used the same political sources 
throughout the period under study. There 
were no clear nuances of reconciliation 
being made by the Malaysian news articles, 
comments, and letters except from 13 
December 1993 onwards, when Keating 
yielded to pressures for a fonnal 'apology'. 
Neither the Malaysian news coverage nor 
letters to the editor were explicitly critical of 
Dr Mahathir as were the critical news 
interpretation of Keating and, to a lesser 
extent, Dr Mahathir in the Australian papers. 
The lack of critical comments by 
Malaysian journalists in general can be 
explained by reference to a headline in the 
Star (3 December 1993): 'Ministry Probes 
Remarks Made by Trader'. The two-
paragraph lead read: 
TIle Home Ministry is investigating rcports 
that a MalaySian businessman ridiculed 
government leaders in an interview by an 
Australian radio. Deputy Minister Datuk 
Megat Junid Megal Ayub said yesterday the 
ministry would study the repon before 
taking action as 'the foreign media has the 
tendency to twist facts and misquote. It 
will be a shame if the allegations are true: 
he said. 
Within this framework of cautious public 
discourse and warnings of punitive 
measures, it is hard to infer from the limited 
content analysis alone whether Malaysians 
in general were critical of Dr Mahathir's 
reaction, whereas in the Australian papers, 
criticisms of Keating were markedly clearer 
than in the Malaysian papers, as can be seen 
in Table 1. According to the tone of coverage 
as reflected by the articles (Table 1), the NST, 
the Star and Utusan MalaYSia together 
Media Intemafional Australia 
recorded a total of 29 counts which were 
supportive of Dr Mahathir's reactions, while 
28 were critical of Keating. Despite the 
apparent tonal spread from critical of 
Keating, to mediatory and neutral (both 
toml1ing 28 counts), there was a tendency for 
the NST, the Star and Utusan MalaySia to 
steer clear of any explicit criticism of Dr 
Mabathir. 
The subjectivity of the Malaysian papers 
becomes clearer when compared to the SMH 
and the Australian, which together had a 
more critical (48) than supportive (21) tone 
towards Keating's remarks. Tn contrast to the 
Malaysian coverage, Australian newspapers 
tend to converge on the mediatory and 
neutral tone, with a total count of 75. The 
overall tone of the SMHs coverage, as 
shown in Table 1, was fairly spread out with 
no explicit hit at Dr Mahathir or Malaysia in 
general. Some criticisms, however, were 
contained in the news pages. Two-thirds of 
the SMHs fl(:ws coverage was either 
mediatory - that is, it had a tone appealing 
for reconciliation - or was neutral. The other 
third was critical of Keating and it was within 
this material that both Australian business 
and Malaysian sources tended to dominate. 
Some of the SMH comments were directed 
against Dr Mahathir, but again the sample is 
small given the scope of tbis story. Only 11 
SlI1H comment pieces were found and coded 
by the second author, compared to 23 in the 
Australian. 
Table 3 shows that both the Malaysian and 
Australian newspapers relied heavily on 
politicians as their primary source. SMH 
relied heavily on Malaysian (18) and 
Australian (17) politicians while NST relied 
toO heavily on Malaysian politicians (21) and 
few Australian politicians (6). There was 
Iitde effort made to reach out to other 
sources. The most telling statistics whicb 
indicate this trend is the small number of 
direct quotes used in the news and 
commentary. 111is is surprising given the 
number of Dr Mahathir's off-siders who 
were willing to exert pressure on Australia, 
and the supporr Keating's senior ministers 
were obliged to show their leader. We can 
perhaps suggest that journalists in both 
countries are bound into news routines and 
led by political currents that promote a 
sameness in sl"yle, content and source 
diverSity. 
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Australian politicians cited by Malaysian 
reporters were Dr John Hewson, Premier 
Richard COUrt, SenalOr Il1Y, Senator Cook, 
Senator Evans, and Australia's most recently 
deposed Prime Minister, Bob Hawke. 
Among the 21 Malaysian politicians cited, 
only one, Lim Kit Siang, came from the 
Malaysian Opposition party; the rest came 
from Dr Mahathir's cabinet and the UMNO 
Youth party. In the Malaysian press, 
Australian business sources were mainly 
taken from the agencies, AfP and Reuters. 
Australian newspapers quofed by the 
Malaysian papers were the Age, the 
Australian, and the Australian Financial 
Review. 
News attention was mainly focused on 
attempts, more so by Malaysia than 
Australia, to gain advantage or not to appear 
to be backing down. This was reflected in 
the use of sources close to Keating and Dr 
Mahathir, and the close scrutiny of all official 
comments from well-placed figures in each 
political circle. Coverage in the Australian is 
indicative of this. Once Dr Mahathir had 
publicly supported attempts to gain an 
Australian apology, the paper focused 
almost exclusively on potential harm to 
business relationship, threats to exports and 
bans on Australian imports to Malaysia. The 
sub-text was that Keating should apologise, 
or at least attempt to mollify a (justifiably) 
angry Dr Mahathir. 
This echoes Van Oijk's assertion (988), in 
his topiC and actor analysis of domestic 
news, that it is often a reproduction of the 
dominante and power structures of the 
nation. It is well known that there is a 
tendency [Q give preference to the power 
elite's reactions to events rather than explain 
tbe details and backgrounds of political and 
social opposition and conflict. At this 
fundamental level, there is not much 
difference between the free press of the 
western countries (Australia ) or the more 
controlled press in some Asian countries 
(Malaysia ). 
Action to repair the damage was central 10 
the ongoing drama played out in the pages 
of the press. Coverage of a potential 
showdown between Dr Mahathir and 
Australian ministers (Senator Cook and 
Senator Ray) visiting Malaysia, highlighted 
the 'conflict' news value. In the first week, 
front-page attention in the SMH was on 
MalaySian demands for an apology from 
"3 
Recalcitrant or Keras Kepa/a? 
Keating (29 November 1993) and Keating's 
reluctance to make a formal reply (30 
November 1993 and 2 December 1993), 
whereas in the three Malaysian papers, ir 
was an immediate outrage, both in the news 
articles and comment pieces, which 
condemned Keating's conduct, Ihe 
Australian press and Australian manners in 
general. 
Table 5 shows that Ihe most imponant 
theme in the coverage by papers from both 
countries was Keating's conduct, which 
provided the confrontation. The possible 
damage to commercial links constiluted the 
developing 'drama' and talk of reconciliation 
dominated the news. Concern about Dr 
Mahathir's conduct in Ihe Australian papers 
was nor as obvious as concern with the 
implications of the row on Australia's 
commercial ties with Malaysia. 
On the other hand, Malaysian papers were 
more focused on denied national pride, 
caused by Keating's remark, than 
commercial ties. Throughout the period 
under study, Ihe NST and Utusan Malaysia 
had only one editorial each, the Star had 
none. The SMH, however, had five editorials 
commenting directly on the Keating-
Mahathir row and one on public perception 
of Keating's arrogance (7 December 1993). 
The editorials suggest an interesting 'tonal' 
cluster beginning with neutrality, followed 
by a mediatory tone, then criticising Keating 
when it became 'safe', and finally supponing 
Keating's vision of a strong 'Australian way' 
in Asia. 
The last SMH editorial on 13 December 
1993 wrapped up the row under the 
headline 'Keating view of Australia'. It was 
clearly framed as 'Ihem and us' and was very 
supponive of Kealing's view that Australia 
would go into Asia feeling 'sure of who we 
are and what we stand for'. The editorial said 
that the lesson from the row was 'stating {he 
obvious ... Australia is not and never will be 
an "Asian nation'" and that there was a 'gulf 
in attitudes and sensibilities' between 
Australians and 'at least thar one country of 
Asia (Malaysia}'. EdifOrials in the Australian 
were either neutral or mediatory, and 
focused on mending the relationship; the 
headlines indicate exacdy the tone of the 
content: 'Building bridges to Asia' (27-28 
November 1993); 'Right tone for Asian 
diplomacy' (30 November 1993); 'Malaysian 
rift should end' (4-5 December 1993); 'How 
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regional ries must be tended' 02-13 
December 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Padraic McGuinness, writing his column for 
the Sydney Morning Herald during the row, 
concurred with several Malaysian politicians 
Ihat the Australian press corps was ill-
equipped for rhe job of reponing on Asian 
affairs. There were also suggestions before 
November 1993 that the Australian media 
should self-censor their commentS about our 
Asian neighbours in the 'national interest' 
(Rowlings 1989). This call was taken up by 
the media in response 10 alleged lapses in 
standards by reponers covering the Keating-
Mahathir story. 
The last charge levelled at the Australian 
media by Asian leaders was by Singapore's 
senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew, at the 
National Press Club luncheon in Canberra 
on 20 April 20 1994, when he said that 
Australian journalists never sufficiently 
background rheir stories on Asian evems. 
Inslead, he said, they tended to focus on bad 
working conditions, corruption, or sex 
tourism. If Lee's criticisms were true, one 
might expect to find that the coverage of the 
'recalcitrant' row would fall in this populistic 
vein. 
But our content analysis of the Auslralian 
press leads us to conclude otherwise. 
Despite the initial media hype over Keating's 
candour, SMH and the Australian generally 
provided a spread of coverage from straight 
news to comments, editorials, and letters. 
However, the MalaySian papers' explicit 
suppon of Dr Mahathir, their single focus on 
Keating's conduct and Australian 'manners', 
and their lack of diversity in news sources, 
angles and analyses, connote a leaning 
towards a more populistic genre than the 
Auslralian papers. The element of bitter 
politico-cultural conflict was never far from 
the MalaySian headlines. 
In their collective reportage of the 
'recalcitrant' row and disparaging criticisms 
of Australian media, Malaysian journalists, 
who are trained in a political system which 
sees the press as instrumental in national 
development, have placed the national 
imerest of 'standing up to the West' above 
professional journalistic balance. Despite 
the much-touted 'nation-building' and 
development-oriented news culture of 
Malaysian journalist-~ (Arabi & Pawanteh 
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1989; LenI1991), they nevenheless do share 
with their Australian coumerpans some of 
the conventional values of conflict and 
drama in their news-making rilUa!. 
Auslfalian journalists, in providing a 
greater balance of news articles, analyses 
and comment pieces oflhe row, have shown 
that media attitudes towards Malaysia 
perhaps are changing since Barlow and 
Chambers were hanged in Penang in 1986, 
Nevertheless, there was a ritualistic 
tendency by journalists to assimi1:lle and 
Eric Lao & Martin Hirst 
interpret the diplomatic row with what 
was interesting or familiar to their 
respective Malaysian and Auslralian 
readers. What journalists from both 
countries do. n"ot '"share is' their perception 
of the basic function of the press and theiT 
role in promoting national development 
and sustaining national pride. The 
philosophical and strucTUral nature of the 
MalaySian and Australian press are as 
divergent as Keating and Dr Mahathir are 
in their idiosyncrasies. 
TABLE 1: TONE OF COVERAGE AS REFLECTED BY OVERALL ARTICLES' 
I Dr Mahathlr Paul Keatmg 
Critical Supportive Mediatory Neutral Critical Supportive Total 
NST(N-31)*" 
News 10 9 4 9 3 35 
Comments 1 3 4 
Editorial 1 1 
Leners 1 1 2 
Total 11 2 5 14 ~ 42 
The Star (N-19) Total 
News 7 6 2 3 2 20 
Comments 1 1 3 
Editorial 
Letters 1 1 4 6 
Total 9 8 2 8 2 29 
Utusan M'sia (N=16) Total 
News 8 2 1 4 15 
Comments 1 1 2 
Editorial 1 1 2 
Letters 
News 6 11 9 24 
Comments 3 1 3 2 2 11 
Editorial 0 1 2 1 1 5 
Letters 2 3 4 9 11 22 
Total 5 11 2. 21 14 62 
Australian (N=83) Total 
News 0 11 11 9 1 32 
Comments 1 2 9 9 1 22 
Editorial 3 1 4 
Letters 3 3 4 9 5 25 
TOTAL 4 1 19 25 27 7 83 
• Critical tone refers to stories willeh explicitly hi! at either Dr Mahathir's reactions or Keallng's remark through the 
reporter's attributions. Supponive tone refers to stories which explicitly defended Dr Mahathir's reactions Of Keating's 
remark through tile reponer's attributions. Medlarory tone generaUy refers to mu](iple source stories wllich attempted 
to ~ppease and explain the context of the diplomatic row. Neutral tone refers to straigln news stories which did not 
explicitly critld.., nor suppon Dr Mahathi. 's reactions or Ke:uing's remark. 
•• N refers 10 the 10tal number of anicles. The COUnts for lone of coverage exceed N as One anicle may renec! both 
a supportive and medialory lOne, thus comprising two count~. 
SMH, Sy<h'eyMomlllg Hemld NST, Nuw Stmils TtmfJli 
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TABLE 2: TONE OF COVERAGE BY NUMBER OF DIRECT QUOTATIONS' 
Dr Mahathlr Paul Keatmg 
Critical** Supportive Mediatory Neutral Critical Supportive 
NST 1 3 34 13 31 9 
The Star 2 8 16 13 6 7 
UM 2 4 3 4 17 
Total 5 IS 51 30 54 16 
SMH 11 3 34 26 30 17 
Australian 12 46 25 44 34 
Total 12 15 80 51 74 51 
• In tile context of this study, only quOtations referring expliCitly to Dr Mahalhir ~nJ Ke~ting were coded. Car~ful 
reading of the direct quO!ations Were made to establish their context. Quola\lons related to commercial ties, trade 
relalions, economic sanclions, etc, without direct reference to either Dr Mahathir Or Ke'Jting, were nO! coded_ 
•• Critical quotes are those which explicitly hit al either Dr Mahathir 's reaction or Keating's remark. Supportive quotes 
are thoM' wllich explicitly Jefended or rotionaUsed Dr Mallatllir's reactions or Keating's remark. Mediatory quotes are 
Ihose aimed at explaining the import~nce of reconciliation. Neutral qUOtes are generally Ihose which highlighted the 
importance of reconciliation without judgemem on either Dr Mah'uhir's reaction Or Keating's remark. 
TABLE 3: TYPE OF SOURCES USED IN STORIES' 
NST UM The Star SMH Australian 
Malaysian officials 3 3 3 6 1 
MalaySian politicians 21 20 9 18 14 
MalaySian business 4 1 
Ordinary citizens 3 0 3 2 5 
Malaysian NGOs 2 
Australian officials 5 11 
Australian politicians 6 4 17 11 
Australian business 5 1 2 6 10 
Australian media 3 3 2 5 2 
MalaySian media 2 3 
• Type of sources are defined as those wllo are auributcd in all the stories anaIYM'd_ The M1U,ce is cOlJnted only OnCe 
even though they are a((rlbl.lted variedLy throughoul tile study perlod_ For instance, Senator R.1Y and Sena10r Cook 
were quO!ed often in both the MalaySian and Australian newsp;1pers. However, bOlh were coded only once. In the 
case of Malaysia, for inslance, 21 different politicians were used t>y reponers from NST, .nd 9 (rom tile Slar. 
TABLE 4: COVERAGE BY FREQUENCY OF THEMATIC 
CATEGORIES IN MAlAYSIAN AND AUSTRAUAN NEWSPAPERS' 
NST UM The Star 
Keating's conduct 15 10 5 
Mahalhir's conduct 1 
Cultural differences 8 2 3 
Commercial ties 12 7 7 
Reconciliation 6 5 7 
Role of Aust media 6 2 
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Table 4 Cominu(~d 
• 'Conducf refers 10 the overall interpretation and framing of Dr Mahathir's and Keating's dlplomaHc aCCions, Cultural 
differences' refers to stories which emphasised the differences between Australia" and Malaysia" social-political 
culture. 'Commercial ties' refers to slOries which focused on trade links, defence co-oper.nion, and education between 
Malaysia and AustraUa, 'Reconciliation' refers 10 stories which focused on effons by KeaH"8 10 make an apology 10 
Dr Mah:tthir. 'Role of the Australian/Malaysian media' refers to Ihe responsibility or irresponsibility of the media in 
appeasing or fanning the incident. 
TABLE 5: FREQUENCY OF THEMATIC CATEGORIES 
IN MAlAYSIAN AND AUSTRAlIAN NEWSPAPERS BY TYPE OF ARTICLES 
NST News Comment Editorial Letters Tolal 
Keating's conduct 11 2 1 1 15 
Dr Mahathir's conduct 
Cultural differences 4 2 1 8 
Commercial ties 12 12 
Reconciliation 6 6 
Role of Aust media 2 3 1 6 
Role of M'sian media 
The Star News Comment Edilorial letters Total 
Keating's conduct 1 1 3 5 
Dr Mahathir's conduct 1 1 
Cullural differences 1 2 3 
Commercial ties 7 7 
Reconciliation 7 7 
Role of Awn media 2 2 
Role of M'sian media 
Utusan Malaysia News Comment I:ditorial letters Total 
Keating's conduct 8 1 1 10 
Dr Mahathir's conduct 
Cultural differences 2 2 
Commercial ties 5 1 1 7 
Reconciliation 4 5 
Role of Aust media 
Role of M'sian media 
SMH News Comment Editorial Letters Total 
Keating's conduct 15 8 3 17 43 
Dr Mahathir's conduct 1 5 2 9 17 
Cultural differences 6 5 2 5 18 
Commercial ties 18 4 2 7 31 
Reconciliation 13 5 5 24 
Role of Aust media 7 4 11 
Role of M'sian media 0 3 3 
The Australian News Comment Editorial Letters Total 
Keating's conduct 15 14 3 11 43 
Dr Mahathir's conduct 4 5 8 17 
Cultural differences 9 10 3 8 30 
Commercial ties 18 17 4 11 5D 
Reconciliation 12 11 3 2 28 
Role of Aust media 1 6 3 10 
Role of M'sian media 2 2 3 
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ENDNOTES 
1. See The Malay Dilemma, by Mahathir bin 
Mohamed, Federal public:lIions, Singapore, 19n, 
154-68. 
2. The national ideology, Rukunegara, which 
comprises five tenets of universal values, was 
promulgated by the Malaysian government in the 
aftermath of the racial riot of 13 May 1969. It is 
aimed at ensuring that the ideals for achieving 
national unity are firmly embedded in the heans 
and minds of the people, panicularly those who 
work in the media. The ideology concentrmes on 
three main areas: first, prevention of communal 
violence supponed by efforts to promote ethnic 
relations; second, to redress economic imbalance 
among the ethnic groups; and finally, to promote 
a sense of identity of, and loyalty to, the nmion 
and King. 
3. Greg Sheridan, 1994;Film Fallout Shows 
Danger of Stereotyping Malaysia,' Am/raJ/an, 2-3 
April. 
4. Menteri Besar (equivalent to a Premier in 
Australia) of Kelantan, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, as 
reponed in the New Strails Times, 27 November 
1993. 
5. The Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, 
was reported as saying in the NewSlrails Times. 'I 
think it is an unacceptable reason if it is at all true. 
The Nazis were brutal and cruel and the victims, 
be they Jews or non-Jews, were victims and our 
sympathies should be with them; (Greg Sheridan, 
Australian, 2-3 April 1994). 
6. Group editor of the New Strairs Times, Kadir 
Jasin, said in his column on 27 March, 'I can only 
express my shock at the arrogance of the board 
and later the kind of justification it PUt up to 
explain its action'. The Film Censorship Board, 
said that they believed Schtndler's List was a 
prop;1ganda film on behalf of Jews. 
7. The SUllday Times in London reponed on 23 
February 1994 that a British construction firm, 
Wimpey International, was prepared to offer a 
US$50,OOO bribe to Dr Mahathir 's government to 
win a £615 million contract for the Pergau Dam 
project in 1985. The allegation was tied in with 
Britain's £23-<1 million development aid with arms 
sales and other trade. Dr Mahathir had flatly 
denied the allegmion. The arms deal and the 
agreement to fund the dam followed successful 
effons in that year by Margaret Thatcher, then 
Prime Minister, to improve relations with Dr 
Mahathir after his 'Buy British Last' policy 
(Independent, London, 29 February 1994). 
8. AFI>/Bemama News Agency wire copy, 23 
March 1994. 
9. The Printing Presses and PubltcatiollSActl984 
is designed to 'regulate the use of printing presses 
and the priming, importation, production, 
reproduction, publishing and distribution of 
publications, and for matters connected 
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therewith'. Under this Act, the Home Affairs 
Minister is empowered to revoke or suspend a 
licence if he is 'satisfied that any printing press is 
used for priming any mailer which is prejudicial 
to public order or national security' (Section 
13-1). Controls can also be imposed on what are 
termed as 'undesirable publications', which refer 
to any publication that is likely to comain 
'anything that is prejudicial to or likely to be 
prejudiCial to public order, morality, security, 
prejudicial to public interest or national interest' 
(Section 7-1-10). For details of the media system 
in Malaysia, refer to 'Media, Ethnicity and National 
Unity-A Malaysian Report', by Syed Arabi Idid & 
Latiffah Pawanteh, Media Asia, 16-2, 1989, pp. 
78-85. 
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